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INVASION PRODUCES FURTHER DISARRAY IN COMMUNIST RANKS

The shock waves reverberating throughout the communist movement from the invasion of Czechoslovakia have brought further into the open the divergent aims and policies underlying the tensions straining communist ranks. Triggering reaction from parties standing at all points of a wide spectrum, the invasion has produced such strange bedfellows as the Yugoslavs and their bitter enemies in Albania, while putting the rabidly anti-Soviet Chinese at odds with the radical regimes in North Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. The depth of the impact of Moscow's drastic action can be measured by an unprecedented rebuke administered to that sacred cow of world communism, the Hanoi regime, which piqued the Albanians by approving what Tirana calls the "barbarous fascist-type aggression" committed against the Czechoslovaks.

The heightened disarray in communist ranks also casts a dark cloud over the world party conference which Moscow has long prepared in an effort to rally whatever forces that could still be mustered behind a Soviet banner of unity. Particularly significant in this connection is the indictment of the Soviet action by the important Italian Communist Party and the long-faithful French party, as part of the virtually unanimous disapproval of the invasion by the communist parties of Western Europe.

Apart from Moscow's four hard-core allies which joined in the military intervention, endorsements have been forthcoming from the Soviet satellite in Ulan Bator, from traditionally docile pro-Soviet parties in Latin America, and from the usual scattering of dependent and clandestine parties which revolve in the Soviet orbit. Support also was won from Hanoi, Pyongyang, and Havana, which like the disapproving Chinese offered their first direct comment on the Czechoslovak situation only after the invasion itself.

The divergent responses to the invasion have provided another glimpse into the cracks dividing Peking and Tirana, on the one hand, and the militant independents in Hanoi, Pyongyang, and Havana on the other. The latter parties, violently anti-American and seeking bloc support for their embattled regimes, have viewed the invasion as a necessary measure to preserve Czechoslovakia's membership in the socialist camp. The Chinese, however, in keeping

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with their overriding hostility toward the Soviets and with their increasingly isolated stance within the socialist bloc, joined the Albanians in venomously assailing the invasion while pronouncing curses on both the Soviet and Czech leaderships as revisionists beyond redemption. Fidel Castro managed both to endorse the invasion and to denounce the Soviets. While approving the military intervention on notably candid grounds of communist realpolitik, Castro at the same time took the occasion to indulge his own grievances against Moscow on a wide variety of issues.

Still another line is represented by the positions taken by the Rumanians and Yugoslavs, the parties which support autonomous trends in the communist movement and outflank Moscow in seeking to promote East-West detente. Rumania and Yugoslavia, as Moscow has ruefully noted, find themselves in the company of the Chinese and Albanians in denouncing the invasion. The recriminations arising from criticism by Bucharest and Belgrade have provoked a renewal of Soviet polemics against the Yugoslavs and have elicited open attacks by Moscow on Rumanian positions which were previously ignored or countered only indirectly in Soviet media.

Following is a review of the treatment of the invasion by the media of Moscow's four allies, the Rumanian and Yugoslav reactions and the response they generated in Moscow, the positions of the French and Italian communist parties, those of Castro and the Latin American parties, and the propaganda reactions from Peking and from Hanoi.